In this work, using a game-theoretic approach, cost-sensitive mechanisms that lead to reliable Internet-based computing are designed. In particular, we consider Internet-based master-worker computations, where a master processor assigns, across the Internet, a computational task to a set of potentially untrusted worker processors and collects their responses. Workers may collude in order to increase their benefit.
is on complex combinations of the efforts of the workers that influence the outcome. In [3] , where the problem was first introduced, the goal was to study how the utility of the master is affected if the equilibria space is limited to pure strategies. I.e., equilibria computation where it is assumed that the players do not randomize their choice and, instead, deterministically choose among one of the available strategies. To that extent, the computation of a few Boolean functions is evaluated. In [5] mixed strategies were considered: if the parameters of the problem yield multiple mixed equilibrium points, it is assumed that workers accept one "suggested" by the master. This is contrasted with our work as we require the master to enforce a single equilibrium point (referred as strong implementation in [3] ). The work in [11] investigates the effect of auditing by allowing the master to audit some workers (by random sampling) and verify their work. In our work, the master decides probabilistically whether to verify all workers or none. In general, the spirit of the framework considered in Combinatorial agency is similar to the one we consider in the present work in the sense that there is a master wishing a specific outcome and it must provide necessary incentives to rational workers so to reach that outcome (exerting effort can be considered as the worker performing the task, and not, as the worker not performing the task and reporting a bogus result). However, there are several differences. The main difference is that in our framework, the worker actions cannot really be viewed as hidden. The master receives a response by each worker and it is aware that either the worker has truthfully performed the task or not. The outcome is affected by each worker's action in the case that no verification is performed (in a similar fashion as the majority boolean "technology" in Combinatorial agency) but via verification the master can determine the exact strategy used by each worker and apply a specific reward/punishment scheme. In the framework considered in combinatorial agency, the master witnesses the outcome of the computation, but it has no knowledge of the possible actions that the worker might take. For this purpose, the master needs to devise contracts for each worker based on the observed outcome of the computation and not on each worker's possible action (as in our framework). Another important difference includes the fact that our scheme considers worker punishment, as opposed to the schemes in combinatorial agency where workers cannot be fined (limited liability constraint); this is possible in our framework as workers' actions are "contractible" (either it performs a task or not).
Monderer and Tennenholtz [32] consider a master-worker framework where the master wishes to influence the behavior of rational workers in a game, which is not under the master's control. Namely, the master cannot design a new game, cannot enforce worker's behavior, cannot penalize the workers and cannot prohibit strategies available to the workers. In the framework we consider in the present work, the master might not be able to control all the parameters of the game (e.g., the various reward schemes and other system parameters that are part of the game) but it can indirectly influence the behavior of the workers by the one parameter that it surely controls: the probability of auditing the results returned by the workers.
A somewhat related work is [8] in which they face the problem of bootstrapping a P2P computing system, in the presence of rational peers. The goal is to incentivize peers to join the system, for which they propose a scheme that mixes lottery psychology and multilevel marketing. In our setting, the master could use their scheme to recruit workers. We assume in this paper that enough workers are willing to participate in the computation.
Du et al. [10] present a commitment-based sampling scheme for cheater detection in Grid computing that is based on Merkle trees. Their model considers a task as a domain of inputs D = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n } and a function f such that each f (x) must be computed for all x ∈ D. Instead of using redundant task allocation (as in our work), or double-checking the worker's computation for each x, the master allocates the task to a worker and randomly selects a small number of inputs from D and double-checks these results. As the authors point out, their technique works well for input domains of large size (large |D|) but does not for small |D|; our redundant allocation scheme could be considered for such small-sized input domains.
Kuhn et al. [29] consider a distributed verification mechanism for computational Grids. Instead of having the master checking and detecting cheaters, their mechanism passes this "responsibility" to the workers. The master distributes two different kinds of tasks to workers, regular computation tasks, and checking units. For the first type the worker is required to compute its result, as oppose to checking tasks that require the worker to perform a number of checks for different results reported by other workers. Workers are encouraged to act correctly via credit points (that can be either used in a form of prestige, or be converted to real money). The work in the present paper focuses on having the master to obtain the correct result within some probability of success rather than detecting cheaters (partially this is achieved, but it is not the main objective of the master). For cheater detection to be beneficiary, the computation must be run over several rounds. Our work, instead, considers a one-shot protocol that enables fast termination (the benefit of one-round mechanisms is partially supported by the work of Kondo et al. [25] that have demonstrated experimentally that tasks may take much more than one day of CPU time to complete).
Framework. We consider a distributed system consisting of a master processor that assigns a computational task to a set of workers to compute and return the task result. The tasks considered in this work are assumed to have a unique solution. Although such limitation reduces the scope of application of the mechanisms presented [43] , there are plenty of computations where the correct solution is unique. E.g., any mathematical function. Notice that we consider one-shot computations only. I.e., in this work we do not consider multiple computations where workers may accumulate reputation according to past behavior.
It is assumed that the master has the possibility of verifying whether the value returned by a worker is the correct result of the task. It is also assumed that verifying an answer is more efficient than computing the task [19] (e.g., N P -complete problems if P = N P ), but the correct result of the computation is not obtained if the verification fails. Therefore, by verifying, the master does not necessarily obtain the correct answer (e.g., when all workers cheat) 2 . As in [8, 46] , workers are assumed to be rational and seek to maximize their benefit, i.e., they are not destructively malicious. We note that this assumption can conceptually be justified by the work of Shneidman and Parkes [41] where they reason on the connection of rational players-of Algorithmic Mechanism Design-and workers in realistic P2P systems. Furthermore, we do not consider non-intentional errors produced by hardware or software problems.
The general protocol used by master and workers is the following. The master process assigns the task to n workers. Each worker processor i cheats with probability p (i) C and the master processor verifies the answers with some probability p V . If the master processor verifies, it rewards the honest workers and penalizes the cheaters. If the master does not verify, it accepts the answer returned by the majority of workers. However, it does not penalize any worker given that the majority can be actually cheating. Instead, the master rewards workers according to one of the three following models. Either the master rewards the majority only (Reward Model R m ), or the master rewards all workers independently of the returned value (Reward Model R a ), or the master does not reward at all (Reward Model R ∅ ).
The model used in this paper comprises the following form of collusion (that covers realistic types of collusions such as Sybil attacks [9] ). Workers form colluding groups. Within the same group workers act homogeneously, i.e., either all choose to cheat, or all choose to be honest, perhaps randomizing their decision by tossing a unique coin. In the case that, within the group, all workers choose to be honest, then only one of them computes the task, and all of them return that result to the master (in this way they avoid the cost of all of them executing the task). In the case that all workers choose to cheat, then they simply agree on a bogus result and send that to the master. In addition, we assume that all "cheating groups" return the same incorrect answer. Both assumptions (homogeneous behavior within groups and unique incorrect answer) are adversarial. Since the master accepts the majority, this behavior maximizes the chances of cheating the master. Being this the worst case (see also [40] ), it subsumes models where cheaters do not necessarily return the same answer. Note that this behavior can be viewed also as a form of collusion. However, this observation does not imply that cheaters coordinate among them such behavior. We also assume that if a worker does not perform the task, then it is (almost) impossible to guess the correct answer (i.e., the probability is negligible). The master, of course, is not aware of the collusions.
Given the protocol above, the game is defined by a set of parameters that include rewards to the workers that return the correct value and punishments to the workers that cheated (that is, returned the incorrect result and "got caught"). Hence, the game is played between the master and the workers, where the first wants to obtain the correct result with a desired probability, while obtaining a desired utility value (in expectation), and the workers decide whether to be honest or cheaters, depending on their expected utility gain or loss. In this paper, we design several games and study the conditions under which unique Nash equilibria (NE) are achieved. The reason for uniqueness is to force all workers to the same strategy; this is similar to strong implementation in Mechanism Design, cf., [3] . (Multiple equilibria could be considered, making further assumptions about the procedure that workers follow to choose one of them. Although the approach might be promising in terms of the utility for the master, in this work correctness is the priority, which as shown later the mechanisms presented here guarantee.) Each NE results in a different benefit for the master and a different probability of accepting an incorrect result. Thus, the master can choose some game conditions so that a unique NE that best fits its goals is achieved.
Contributions.
The main contributions of this paper are:
1. The identification of a collection of realistic payoff parameters that allow to model Internet-based master-worker computational environments in game theoretic terms. These parameters can either be fixed because they are system parameters or be chosen by the master. 2. The definition of four different games that the master can force to be played: (a) A game between the master and a single worker, (b) a game between the master and a worker, played n times (with different workers), (c) a game with a master and n workers, and (d) a game of n workers in which the master participates indirectly. Games (c) and (d) consider collusions, game (a) considers no collusions as there is only one worker, and game (b) only considers singleton groups, where all cheaters return the same value. Together with the three reward models defined above, we have overall defined twelve games among which the master can choose the most convenient to use in each specific context.
3.
The analyses of all the games under general payoff models, and the characterization of conditions under which a unique Nash Equilibrium point is reached for each game and each payoff-model. These analyses lead to mechanisms that the master can run to trade cost and reliability. 4. The design of mechanisms for two specific realistic scenarios, to demonstrate the utility of the analysis. These scenarios reflect, in their fundamental elements, (a) a system of volunteer computing like SETI, and (b) a company that buys computing cycles from Internet computers and sells them to its customers in the form of a task-computation service. The analysis provided for these scenarios in Tables 5 and 6 comprise implicitly a mechanism to decide how to carry out the computation. More specifically, depending on the various parameters of the problem, such as the instance of payoff values, the desired probability of obtaining the correct answer, or a (possibly negative) lower bound on the master's utility, the master may obtain from these tables the game to be played and the reward model that maximally benefit its goal: accuracy, utility, or both.
5.
As examples of the use of the mechanism designed, we consider computations where the result must be correct with probability 1 for any instance of payoff values. Under such requirement, our results show that for scenario (a) the best choice is non-redundant allocation, even with only singleton colluding groups. Furthermore, in this case we show that to obtain always the correct answer it is enough to verify with arbitrarily small probability. Regarding examples of scenario (b), under the same requirement, we evaluate the mechanism for settings where one of three parameter values can be chosen: the number of workers, the worker's punishment for being caught cheating, or the cost of computing the task. If the master only chooses the number of workers n, we show that, again even with only singleton colluding groups the best choice is non-redundant allocation. However, in order to achieve correctness, the required probability of verifying can now be large. When only one of the other two parameters is a choice of the master, namely either the worker's punishment for being caught cheating or the cost of computing the task, we show that the best game is not unique, and it depends on the rest of parameters of the system. In general our analysis depicts the tradeoffs between cost and reliability for a wide range of system parameters, payoffs, and reward models.
Paper Structure. In Section 2 we provide basic definitions to be used throughout the paper. In Section 3 we present and analyze the games proposed. In Section 4 the mechanisms for the two realistic scenarios are designed. Finally, Section 5 presents conclusions and future lines of work.
Definitions
Game Definition. Game participants are referred as workers and master. In order to define the game played in each case, we follow the customary notation used in Game Theory. Given that this notation is repeatedly used throughout the paper, we summarize it in Table 1 for clarity. We assume that the master always chooses an odd number of workers n, which avoids ties in voting settings where the answer space is binary as it is assumed in this paper as a worst case. In order to model collusion among workers, we view the set of workers as a set of non-empty subsets
We refer to each of these subsets as a group of workers or a group for short. We also refer to groups and the master as players. Workers in the same group act homogeneously, i.e., either all choose to cheat, or all choose to be honest, perhaps randomizing their decision by tossing a unique coin. Workers acting individually are modeled as a group of size one. It is assumed that the size or composition of each group is known only to the members of the group, but all cheating groups return the same incorrect answer.
A strategy profile is defined as a mapping from players to pure strategies, denoted as s. For succinctness, we express a strategy profile as a collection of individual strategy choices together with collective strategy choices. For instance, s i = C, s M = V, R −iM , F −iM , T −iM stands for a strategy profile s where group W i chooses strategy C (to cheat), the master chooses strategy V (to verify), a set R −iM of groups (where group W i and the master are not included) randomize their strategy choice with probability p C ∈ (0, 1), a set F −iM of groups deterministically choose strategy C, and a set T −iM of groups deterministically choose strategy C (to be honest). For games with one worker and the master, the strategy profile is composed only by their choices. For example, m CV stands for the master's payoff in the case that the worker cheated and the master verified. We require that, for each group W i , p
and, for the master, p V = 1 − p V . For games where we only have one group or all groups use the same probability, we will express p
) simply by p C (resp. p C ). Whenever the strategy is clear from the context, we will refer to the expected utility of group W i as U i , and for the master as U M . In the games studied the master and the workers have complete information on the algorithm and the parameters involved, except on the number and the composition of the colluding groups.
Equilibrium Definition. We define now precisely the conditions for the equilibrium. In this context, the probability distributions are not independent among members of a group. Furthermore, the formulation of equilibrium conditions among individual workers would violate the very definition of equilibrium since the choice of a worker does change the choices of other workers. Instead, equilibrium conditions are formulated among groups. Of course, the computation of an equilibrium might not be possible since the size of the groups is unknown. But, finding appropriate conditions so that the unique equilibrium is the same independently of that size, the problem may be solved. As it will be seen in the general analysis, depending on the specific combination of payoffs, reward models, and games, knowing some bound (e.g. the trivial one) on the size of the smallest and/or largest group is enough, and sometimes not even necessary. Furthermore, as shown in Section 4, there are cases where all groups are singleton because non-redundant allocation is the best strategy. An important point to be made is that the majority is evaluated in terms of number of single answers. Nevertheless, this fact has an impact on the payoffs of each player, which in this case is a whole group, but not in the correctness of the equilibrium formulation.
Recall from [38] that for any finite game, a mixed strategy profile σ * is a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE) if, and only if, for each player π (either a worker group or the master),
In words, given a MSNE with mixed-strategy profile σ * , for each player π, the expected utility, assuming that all other players do not change their choice, is the same for each pure strategy that the player can choose with positive probability in σ * , and it is not less than the expected utility of any pure strategy with probability zero of being chosen in σ * . A fully MSNE is an equilibrium with mixed strategy profile σ where, for each player π, supp(σ π ) = S π .
Payoffs Definition. We detail in Table 2 the payoff definitions that will be used throughout the paper. All the parameters in this table are non-negative. Notice that we split the reward to a worker into WB A and MC A , to model the fact that the cost of the master might be different than the benefit of a worker. In fact, in some models they may be completely unrelated. Among the parameters involved, we assume that the master has the freedom of choosing the cheater penalty WP C and the worker reward for computing MC A . By tuning these parameters and choosing n, the master achieves the desired trade-off between correctness and cost. Given that the master does not know the composition of groups (if there is any), benefits and punishments are applied individually to each worker, except for the cost for computing the task WC T which is shared among all workers belonging to the same group (as it was explained in the Introduction). Sharing the task cost while being paid/punished individually may provide incentive to collude, but it models precisely the real world σ −i probability distribution over pure strategies used by each player but W i in σ σ i probability distribution over pure strategies used by group W i in σ σ −M probability distribution over pure strategies used by each player but the master in σ σ M probability distribution over pure strategies used by the master in σ 
Equilibria Analysis
In the following sections, different games are studied depending on the participants involved. In order to identify the parameter conditions for which there is an NE, Equations (1) and (2) of the MSNE definition are instantiated in each particular game, without making any assumptions on the payoffs. We call this the general payoffs model. From these instantiations, we obtain conditions on the parameters (payoffs and probabilities) that would make such equilibrium unique. Finally, we introduce the reward models described before on those conditions, so that we can compare among all games and models in Section 4.
Game 1:1: One Master -One Worker
We start the analysis by considering the game between the master and only one worker. Hence, collusions can not occur and we refer to the group just as "the worker."
General Payoffs Model. In order to evaluate all possible equilibria, all the different mixes have to be considered. In other words, according with the range of values that p C and p V can take, we can have fully MSNE, partially MSNE, or pure-strategies NE. More specifically, both p C and p V can take values either 0, 1, or in the open interval (0, 1). Depending on these values, the different conditions in Equations (1) and (2) have to be achieved in order to have an equilibrium. Hence, conditions on p C and p V for each equilibrium can be obtained from these equations. For instance, for the case when p C ∈ (0, 1), p V ∈ (0, 1): From Equation (1), there is a fully MSNE if
simultaneously. These equations determine the value of p C and p V in the MSNE as follows.
The computation of conditions for the other range-cases of p C and p V is similar. On the other hand, the expected utility of the master and the worker in any equilibrium are
, and the probability of accepting the wrong answer is
Recall that in this model we assume that when the master does not verify, it rewards only the majority. Given that there is only one worker, in this case the master rewards always. Under the payoff model detailed in Table 2 , the payoffs are
Replacing appropriately, we obtain the conditions for equilibrium, probability of accepting the wrong answer, and utilities for each case.
Reward Model R a . In this model we assume that if the master does not verify, it rewards all workers independently of the answer. Hence, the analysis is identical to the previous case.
Reward Model R ∅ . Recall that in this model we assume that if the master does not verify, it does not reward the worker. Hence, under the payoff model detailed in Table 2 , the payoffs are:
Replacing appropriately, we obtain the conditions for equilibrium, probability of accepting the wrong answer, and utilities for each case, as we will see in the next section. The probability of accepting the wrong result, the master utility for each case, the conditions for equilibrium, and the workers utility for the reward models R m and R ∅ can be obtained from Tables 3 and 4 by replacing n = 1.
Game 1:1 n : n Games One to One
In this section it is considered the case where the master runs n instances of the one to one game analyzed in the previous section. Workers are assumed to compute the equilibrium as if they were playing alone against the master. Hence, given the assumption that the players are rational and compute the equilibrium to decide what to do, the consideration of collusion is meaningless for this game. Hence, all groups are assumed to have exactly one member; we do assume however that cheaters return the same incorrect value (to obtain worst case analysis). Games where workers know about the existence of other workers and they can collude to fool the master are studied later. Given the equilibria computed in Section 3.1, the master runs n instances of that game, one with each of the n workers, choosing to verify or not with probability p V only once. Additionally, when paying while not verifying, the master rewards all or none according with the one-to-one game.
General Payoffs Model. Since this game is just a multiple-instance version of the previous game, under the payoff model detailed in Table 2 , the conditions for equilibria and the utility of a worker are the same as in Section 3.1. However, the expected utility of the master and the probability of accepting the wrong result change. In order to give those expressions, we define the following notation. Let W be the set of partitions in two subsets (F, T ) of W , i.e.,
F is the set of workers that cheat and T the set of honest workers. We also define master payoff functions m s : {0, 1, . . . , n} → R, that still depend on the number of workers that cheat or not, but are not necessarily just n times the individual payoff of a 1:1 game (reflecting the fact that the cost may include some fixed amount for unique verification or unique cost of being wrong). For the sake of clarity, we will denote the probability that the majority cheats as P C . Then, the probability that the majority cheats, the probability of being wrong, and the master's utility are
Respectively, where
Reward Models. In this game, we assume that the cost of verification MC V is independent of the number of workers (since all cheating workers return the same value) and that, as long as some worker is honest, upon verification the master obtains the correct result. It is important to note that, under this assumption, the probability of obtaining the correct result is not 1 − P wrong , given that if the master verifies but all workers cheat, the master does not obtain the correct result. Recall that the master plays n instances of a one-to-one game, thus, depending on the model, it must reward every worker if not verifying independently of majorities. We summarize the probability of accepting the wrong result, the master utility for each case, the conditions for equilibrium, and the workers utility for the reward models R m and R ∅ in Tables 3 and 4 respectively (Tables 3 and 4 give also these values for Game 1 : 1 replacing appropriately n = 1).
Game 0:n: No Master in the Game
Another natural generalization of the game of Section 3.1 is to consider a game in which the master assigns the task to n workers that play the game among them. Intuitively, it can be seen that, in case of not verifying, workers will compete to be in the majority (to persuade the master). Given that workers know the existence of the other workers, including collusions in the analysis is in order. The question of how the participation of the master in the game would affect the results obtained in this section is addressed in Section 3.4.
General Payoffs Model.
In order to analyze this game, it is convenient to partition the set of groups. More precisely, consider disjoint sets F , T and R, such that F ∪ T ∪ R = W , as follows. F is the set of groups that choose to cheat as a pure strategy, i.e.,
T is the set of groups that choose not to cheat as a pure strategy, i.e., T = {W i |W i ∈ W ∧ p (i) C = 0}. R is the set of groups that randomize their choice, i.e.,
be the expected payoff of group W i for the strategy profile s, taking the expectation over the choice of the master of Equilibrium pC , pV
Conditions
Pwrong 
],
].
In words, the expected utility of a worker in a group that chooses to cheat (resp. to be honest) is, by linearity of expectation, the expected payoff of the worker, the expectation taken over the choice of the master, averaged over all combinations of outcomes cheat/honest of other groups that choose to randomize their strategy choice, this average weighted by the probability of such outcomes.
In order to find conditions for a desired equilibrium, we study what we call the utility differential of a worker, i.e. the difference on the expected utility of a worker if its group chooses to cheat with respect to the case when the group chooses to be honest. More precisely,
For clarity, define N F −i = S∈F−i∪RF |S| and N T −i = S∈T−i∪RT |S|, i.e. the number of cheaters and honest workers respectively except for those in group W i . We also define what we call the payoff differential as the difference on the expected payoff of a worker, the expectation taken over the choice of the master, if its group chooses to cheat with respect to the case when the group chooses to be honest. Furthermore, we denote the payoff differential depending on whether the size of the group has an impact on what is the majority outcome. More precisely, for each partition
In words, the payoff differential of each worker in a group when the majority cheats or is honest independently of the group's choice, and the payoff differential when the decision of the group may change the majority. Given that the payoff depends only on the outcome majority, replacing this notation in Equation 3, we have
In words, the utility differential of a worker is the average of its payoff differential over the three cases defined by the impact of its group over the majority, this average weighted by the probability of such cases.
Restating Equations (1) or (2) in terms of Equation (4), the equilibrium conditions are, for each group that does not choose a pure strategy, the differential utility must be zero (∀i ∈ R, ∆U i (s) = 0); for each group that chooses to cheat as a pure strategy, the differential utility must not be negative (∀i ∈ F, ∆U i (s) ≥ 0); and for each group that chooses to be honest as a pure strategy, the differential utility must not be positive (∀i ∈ T, ∆U i (s) ≤ 0).
The following lemma, which is crucially used in the rest of our analysis, shows that, if there is a given total order among the payoff differentials defined, in order to attain a unique equilibrium all groups must decide deterministically. The proof is based on an algebraic argument.
Lemma 1. Given a game as defined, if ∆w
(i) C ≥ ∆w (i) X ≥ ∆w (i) C for every group W i ∈ W ,
then there is no unique equilibrium where R = ∅ (i.e, all groups decide deterministically).
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, assume there is a unique equilibrium σ for which R = ∅ and ∆w
for every group W i ∈ W . Then, for every group W i ∈ R, ∆U i (s) = 0 must be solvable. If ∆w (i) C ≥ 0, for all W i ∈ R, there would be also an equilibrium where all groups in R choose to cheat and σ would not be unique, which is a contradiction. Consider now the case where there exists some W i ∈ R such that ∆w
Then, it must hold that |R| > 1, otherwise ∆U i = 0 is false for W i . Given that |R| > 1, the probabilities given by the summations in Equation (4) for W i are all strictly bigger than zero. Therefore, given that ∆U i = 0 must be solvable, at least one of ∆w (i) X > 0 and ∆w (i) C > 0 must hold, which is also a contradiction with the assumption that
In the following sections, conditions to obtain unique equilibria under different payoff models are studied. In all these models it holds that ∆w
for all W i ∈ W . Then, by Lemma 1, there is no unique equilibrium where R = ∅. Regarding equilibria where R = ∅, unless the task assigned has a binary output (the answer can be negated), a unique equilibrium where all groups choose to cheat is not useful. Then, we set up p V so that ∆w
X < 0 and ∆w (i) C < 0 for all W i ∈ W so that ∆U i ≥ 0 has no solution and no group can choose to cheat as a pure strategy. Thus, the only equilibrium is for all the groups to choose to be honest, which solves ∆U i ≤ 0. Therefore, p (i) C = 0, ∀W i ∈ W , and hence P wrong = 0.
Reward Model R m . Replacing appropriately the payoffs detailed in Table 2 , we obtain for any group
To make ∆w
And the expected utilities are then
Reward Model R a . Similarly, for any group W i ∈ W ,
Then, the condition to obtain the desired unique equilibrium and the expected utilities are
Reward Model R ∅ . Again, for any group W i ∈ W ,
And the condition to obtain the unique equilibrium and the expected utilities are
In order to maximize the master utility we would like to design games where p V is small. Therefore, we look for a lower bound on p V . It is easy to see that, in all of the three payoff models, the worst case lower bound is given by the group of minimum size. Although at a first glance this fact seems counterintuitive, it is not surprising due to the following two reasons. On one hand, colluders are likely to be in the majority, but the unique equilibrium occurs when all workers are honest. On the other hand, the extra benefit that workers obtain by colluding is not against the master interest since it is just a saving in computation costs.
Game 1:n: One Master -n Workers
We now observe how the conditions obtained in the previous game are modified if the master also participates as a player. The equilibria analysis regarding groups follows the same lines as in Section 3.3. However, now Equations (1) and (2) have to be applied to the master, as follows.
General Payoffs Model.
Recall that R is the set of groups that randomize their choice. Let Γ be the set of partitions in two subsets (R F , R T ) of R, i.e., Γ = {(R F , R T )|R F ∩ R T = ∅ ∧ R F ∪ R T = R}. Then, for the master,
From Equation (2), if p V = 0 the condition is
and if p V = 1 the condition is
The MSNE conditions for groups are the same as in Section 3.3. Hence, the conditions obtained for each of the reward models are the same. However, additional conditions are obtained from the master-utility conditions as follows. As in Section 3.3, the desired unique MSNE occurs when p C = 0. Using that, in the master-utility conditions we get for the reward model R m that if p V < 1, MB R − MC V − nMC A = MB R − nMC A , and if p V = 1,
Therefore, in any case it must hold MC V = 0. For the reward model R a , the master-utility conditions give, if
Therefore, MC V = MC A = 0. Hence, to achieve the goal of forcing the groups to be honest, in this game, verifying must be free for the master.
Algorithmic Mechanisms
In this section two realistic scenarios in which the master-worker model considered could be naturally applicable are proposed. For these scenarios, we determine appropriate games and parameters to be used by the master to maximize its benefit.
The basic protocol (mechanism) used by the master to accept the correct task result while maximizing its benefit is as follows: Given the payoff parameters (these can either be fixed by the system or be chosen by the master), the master sends the task (to be computed), the game to be played, the probability of verification p V , and the payoff model to be used. For computational reasons, the master also sends a certificate to the workers. The certificate includes the strategy that the workers must play to achieve the unique NE, together with the appropriate data to demonstrate this fact 3 . More details for the use of the certificate are given in Section 4.3.
After receiving the replies from all workers, and independently of the distribution of the answers, the master processor chooses to verify the answers with the probability p V . If the answers were not verified it accepts the result of the majority. Then, it applies the corresponding reward model. The protocol is detailed in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Master algorithm
send (task, game, p V , payoff model R, certificate) to all workers; upon receiving all answers do verify the answers with probability p V ; if the answers were not verified then accept the majority; apply the reward model; Hence, the master, given the payoff parameters, can determine the game and parameters (including the value of p V ) to force the workers into a unique NE, that would yield the correct task result (with high probability) while maximizing the master's benefit. Examples of specific parameters (including the value of p V ) and games such that the master can achieve this are analyzed in the following subsections.
SETI-like Scenario
The first scenario considered is a volunteer computing system such as SETI@home, where users accept to donate part of their processors idle time to collaborate in the computation of large tasks. In this case, we assume that workers incur in no cost to perform the task, but they obtain a benefit by being recognized as having performed it (possibly in the form of prestige, e.g, by being included on SETI's top contributors list). Hence, we assume that WB A > WC T = 0. The master incurs in a (possibly small) cost MC A when rewarding a worker (e.g., by advertising its participation in the project). As assumed in the general model, in this model the master may verify the values returned by the workers, at a cost MC V > 0. We also assume that the master obtains a benefit MB R > MC A if it accepts the correct result of the task, and suffers a cost MP W > MC V if it accepts an incorrect value.
Under these constraints, the equilibria for games 1:1 and 1:1 n collapse to one single equilibrium point. Also, since game 1:n requires free verification (MC V = 0) for the equilibrium to be unique, it cannot be used in this scenario. The different applicable cases are summarized in Table 5 . In this table it can be observed that in games 1:1 and 1:1 Table 5 : SETI-like Scenario the equilibrium is achieved with any value of p C in an interval. The master has no way to force the specific value of p C that a worker uses within the interval. And, in particular, it cannot force p C = 0 (i.e., P wrong = 0). Additionally, looking at the master utility, all games have U M < MB R . However, in game (0 : n,R ∅ ) the master can make U M arbitrarily close to MB R by setting p V arbitrarily small. (Notice that the utility of a worker will be arbitrarily small likewise, but given that workers are volunteering this is not a problem.) In conclusion, the game (0:n,R ∅ ) with n = 1 
Contractor Scenario
The second scenario considered is a company that buys computational power from Internet users and sells it to computation-hungry costumers. In this case the company pays the users an amount S = WB A = MC A for using their computing capabilities, and charges the consumers another amount MB R > MC A for the provided service. Since the users are not volunteers in this scenario, we assume that computing a task is not free for them (i.e., WC T > 0), and they must have incentives to participate (i.e., U Wi > 0, ∀W i ∈ W ). As in the previous case, we assume that the master verifies and has a cost for accepting a wrong value, such that MP W > MC V > 0. Again, under these assumptions, the equilibria for games 1:1 and 1:1 n collapse to unique equilibria and game 1:n can not be used. The different cases are summarized in Table 6 . Observe that there are cases in this table in which the group has negative expected utility U Wi . Given that in this scenario workers are not volunteers, they will not accept to participate in such a game. This fact immediately rules out games (1 : 1,R ∅ ) and (1 : 1 n ,R ∅ ) and requires that WB A > WC T in general. Similarly, this restriction forces the master to use a value of p V > WC T /|W i |WB A , ∀W i ∈ W in game (0 :n,R ∅ ). Finally, comparing games (0:n,R m ) and (0:n,R a ), it can be seen that the master would never choose the former, because the lower bound of p V is smaller in the latter while the rest of expressions are the same, which leads to a larger master utility.
In this scenario, beyond choosing the game and number of workers n as in the previous one, we assume that the master can also choose the reward WB A to the workers for correctly computing the task, and the punishment WP C if they are caught returning an incorrect value. All possible combined variations of these parameters yield a huge number of cases to be considered. In what follows, we assume that the master only can choose one of these parameters, while the rest are predefined. A study of richer combinations is left for future work. The following notation is used for clarity. Whenever a parameter may be different among different games being compared, a super-index indicates the game to which the parameter belongs. For instance, U
is the utility of the master for game (i, j). MC A and WB A are referred to as simply S (= MC A = WB A ).
A simple observation of games (0 : n,R a ) and (0 : n,R ∅ ) leads to find that in both cases it is convenient for the master to choose the smallest possible value of p V . For this reason, in the following we assume in these games values p 
Tunable n
Regarding games (1 : 1,R m ) and (1 : 1 n ,R m ), in this case the master has no control over p C or p V , since they are completely defined by the application parameters. Hence, the probability of accepting a wrong answer might be arbitrarily close to 1, even for game (1:1 n ,R m ), because P C grows with n if p C > 1/2 as shown in Claim 6. Given that we want to design a mechanism that can be applied to any setting, we rule out these games for this case. In the case that n is tunable, the benefit of the master in games (0:n,R a ) and (0:n,R ∅ ) decreases as n increases. Hence for these games the master chooses n = 1. (So, |W | = |W i | = 1.) Additionally, these games provide P wrong = 0. Out of these games, (0:n,R a ) is better iff MC V > S(S/WC T − 1)(S/WP C + 1). We highlight these observations in the following theorem. (ii) otherwise, reward the worker also if the result is not verified, and verify with probability
for any positive ε arbitrarily close to 0.
Tunable WP C
Proof. Let P C (n, > 1) be the probability that, out of n workers, the number of cheaters exceed the number of honest workers by more than one (i.e., at least 3 given that we consider only odd number of workers), P C (n, = 1) by exactly one, and P C (n, = 1) be the probability that the number of honest workers exceed the number of cheaters by exactly one. Then, P C (n+2) = P C (n, > 1)(p From the previous claim, given that P C = 1/2 for p C = 1/2, we conclude that P C ≤ 1/2. Using that p C ≤ 1/2, P C ≤ 1/2, and MP W > 2MC V , the utility of the master for game (1:1 n ,R m ) is U As shown before, game (0:n,R a ) is better than game (0:n,R ∅ ) when
Comparing games (1:1 n ,R m ) and (0:n,R a ) when WC T < MC V WC T /n − WP C < MB R , we have (MB R − MP W )/2 − nS 
All three conditions are feasible simultaneously for big enough MC V , therefore there exists a scenario for which game (1 : 1 n ,R m ) is better. Notice that under the aforementioned condition, for game (0 : n,R a ) to be better, i.e., n > 4MC V WC T /WP C 2 , it must be true that WP C > 2 MC V WC T /n and the inequality (5) does not hold.
Computational Issues
In previous sections, a mechanism for the master to choose games, payoff models, and appropriate values of p V for different scenarios was designed (based on Algorithm 1). A natural question is what is the computational cost of using such mechanism. In addition to simple arithmetical calculations, there are two kinds of relevant computations required: binomial probabilities and verification of conditions for Nash equilibria. Both computations are n-th degree polynomial evaluations and can be carried out using any of the well-known numerical tools [24] with polynomial asymptotic cost. These numerical methods yield only approximations, but all these calculations are performed either to decide in which case the parameters fit in, or to assign a value to p V , or to compare utilities. Given that these evaluations and assignments were obtained in the design as inequalities or restricted only to lower bounds, it is enough to choose the appropriate side of the approximation in each case. Regarding the computational resources that the workers require to carry out these calculations, notice that the choice of p V in the mechanism only yields a unique NE. Then, in order to make the computation feasible to the workers, the master sends together with the task a certificate proving such equilibrium. Such a certificate is the value of p V , payoff values, game, and payoff model, which is enough to verify uniqueness.
Conclusions
In this paper we consider computational systems in which a master processor assigns tasks for execution to rational workers. We have defined the general model and cost-parameters, and we have proposed and analyzed several games that the master can choose to play in order to achieve high reliability at low cost. Based on our game analysis, we have designed appropriate algorithmic mechanisms for two realistic scenarios of these kinds of systems.
While volunteer computing systems used in practice, like BOINC, use redundant task allocation to detect erroneous answers [2] , it is known that this technique can not guarantee correctness in presence of collusion [46] . Interestingly, our results show that verifying with very small probability can be used to prevent erroneous answers from selfish workers, even under collusion. A richer exploration of the practical implications of the results in this paper is left for future work.
In order to expand and generalize our model, we plan to design more complex mechanisms where more than one parameter at a time is tunable by the master, and consider other realistic scenarios where our work can be applied. It would also be interesting to consider the case where the workers and/or the master do not have complete information of all the system parameters (that is, consider Bayesian Mechanism Design, see e.g. [23] ). Furthermore, we plan to consider the more general problem in which there is a sequence of tasks whose values must be reliably obtained. To this respect, cheater detection mechanisms, as the one considered in [29] , must be deployed and multiple-rounds protocols must be designed.
